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Reviews of Books

reflects the western-centric world view adopted by Canadian and
other officials. This perspective, however, can lead to misinterpretations about the historical dynamics at play in the ‘‘Far East’’ in this
period, particularly the role of China. After all, the events in Northeast Asia for a decade before 1941 and for years afterwards were
about a devastating war that produced up to 100 million refugees.
Recent studies of the fighting, known in China as the War of Resistance, suggest that 25 million Chinese soldiers and civilians died as
a result of the conflict, not Wilford’s figure of 10 million (p. 13),
which is the estimated number of soldiers who died. His reference to
the war as the ‘‘China-Incident’’ (p. 195) reflects the interpretation
of the Japanese imperial government of the time, and he places
Manchukuo in Southeast Asia (p. 103), even though it is in Northeast Asia. The idea of ‘‘crisis’’ may also have contributed to some odd
phrasing, including the notion that ‘‘China deserves due consideration as a Pacific power because it tied up so many Japanese forces
that might otherwise have been deployed elsewhere across the Far
East and the Pacific’’ (p. 14). Japan’s attacks on Pearl Harbor and
Southeast Asia arose out of that country’s invasion of China and
cannot be dissociated from that conflict.
These interpretive issues lie somewhat beyond the main focus
of the book, which makes an important contribution to our understanding of Canadian diplomacy in 1941 at a crucial juncture of
World War II. The author frames the story with much new information, makes fine use of primary research, links domestic policy to
international trends, and provides an insightful analysis of Canadian
policy toward Japan in the months and weeks leading to the attack
on Pearl Harbor.
University of British Columbia

STEVEN LEE

The Universe Unraveling: American Foreign Policy in Cold War Laos. By
Seth Jacobs. (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 2012. xi þ
321 pp. $35)
In the early 1960s, Laos, not Vietnam, generated the most anxiety for U.S. policymakers desperate to halt communism in Southeast Asia. Both Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy
followed developments in the small, landlocked country closely, and
both considered military intervention. This preoccupation with Laos
and the ultimate decision to seek a negotiated rather than a military
settlement, argues Seth Jacobs in his latest book, resulted directly
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from cultural perceptions, in particular an overriding sense of
Laotian indolence.
The story of U.S. resistance and eventual acquiescence to
limited Laotian neutrality has been told many times. Jacobs contributes by developing the cultural side of the U.S. story, emphasizing the contradictory impulses, willful ignorance, and
stereotyping that dominated the thinking of both American officials and the public at large. The author relentlessly berates U.S.
Ambassador J. Graham Parsons, humanitarian Dr. Thomas Dooley
(whom Jacobs uncharitably brands ‘‘a clean-shaven Joe
McCarthy’’), and others for essentializing the Lao as lazy and as
a pacifistic people incapable of being roused to join the American
cause (p. 172). American officials believed that the Pathet Lao, the
aggressive Laotian communists, showed a capability on the battlefield because of their contact with the even more aggressive Viet
Cong rather than any martial strain in the Laotian character.
While never detailing his methodology, Jacobs serves up so
many examples on so many levels that one is willing to concede his
point (although I have studied many of the same events and developments and never particularly noticed this discourse). Whether
this unfortunate essentializing was applied exclusively to Laotians
is another issue. Indeed, U.S. frustration with its allies during the
Cold War often resulted in stereotyping of the sort seen in Laos.
Jacobs argues that policymakers saw the Vietnamese, compared to
the Lao, as a people willing to fight—hence the decision to abandon
Laos and fight in Vietnam. Americans, however, frequently bemoaned their Vietnamese allies in similar terms as they lamented
the Lao. Indeed, Americans intervened in 1965 largely because the
South Vietnamese appeared incapable of mounting an effective
defense. Vietnamization, of course, came later. In the first years of
the war, Americans eschewed the forces of the Republic of Viet
Nam, believing them inferior and ineffective.
If Jacobs’s form of cultural analysis is novel, his ultimate
conclusions are not. He echoes the prevailing view of Kennedy as
a single-minded cold warrior. Following the orthodox line, he is at
pains to explain away Kennedy’s concessions on Laos as anything
but evidence of strategic flexibility. A more balanced assessment,
however, should incorporate evidence of Kennedy’s skepticism
about intervention and his passing interest in expanding neutralization to all of Southeast Asia. What emerges is a more complicated
picture than Jacobs or others would allow.
Most welcome, however, would be an initiative to bring the Laotians more sharply into focus. Jacobs consults only U.S. sources—an
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anomaly in these days of increasingly internationalized histories. In
some cases, the sources are closer than one might imagine. For
instance, the Library of Congress, where Jacobs consulted the Averell Harriman papers, has ten volumes of Laotian Prince Souvanna
Phouma’s diaries (largely written in French) available on
microfilm.
Eastern Illinois University

EDMUND WEHRLE

Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam. By
Lien-Hang T. Nguyen. (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina
Press, 2012. xiv þ 444 pp. $34.95)
This meticulously researched and clearly written study fills
a major gap in the literature on the Vietnam War. The coverage
in the existing literature on the two sides in the Indochina conflict is
imbalanced. We have a clearer picture of American decisionmaking, but our knowledge about how policy was made in Hanoi
is very limited. Most scholars writing on the Vietnam War tend to
focus on the question of how the United States lost the war. In
contrast, only a few historians have flipped the question by exploring how Hanoi won. For instance, William Duiker in his Sacred War
(1995) tried to unlock the mystery of policymaking in North
Vietnam, but his account was not archive-based, and many of his
conclusions were tentative. Lien-Hang Nguyen has tapped into
recently opened archival collections in Vietnam to provide a substantial and highly revealing treatment of Hanoi’s calculations and
maneuvers during the Vietnam War.
One virtue of this volume is its careful dissection of policy
debates within the Politburo of the Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP).
Debunking the myth of a unified collective leadership in Hanoi,
Nguyen demonstrates that divisions and factions existed at the
highest echelon of the VWP. She documents the ascendancy of the
hard-line group led by Le Duan and Le Duc Tho, who edged out Ho
Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap from nearly all major policymaking
junctures, including the decision to focus on cities during the Tet
Offensive. The pivotal figure who emerges from Nguyen’s account is
Le Duan, the longest-serving first secretary of the VWP. Together
with his ally, Le Duc Tho, Le Duan established a repressive party
apparatus and a police state to consolidate their authority in the
North and their control over the war effort in the South. Nguyen
concludes that ‘‘the Vietnamese communist struggle was anything
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